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RECENT CASE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ORDERLY MARKETING AGREEMENTS
Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter
457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
The plaintiffs-a retailer, wholesaler, and importer of footwear-brought an action to enjoin the implementation of two Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs).* The OMAs had been
negotiated between the United States and South Korea, and between
the United States and Taiwan pursuant to the Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1975) (the
Act). The OMAs expressly limited the amount of non-rubber athletic
footwear that South Korea and Taiwan could export to the United
States. The plaintiffs challenged whether the procedures employed in
negotiating these OMAs complied with the procedures mandated by
the Act. The defendants were President Carter, the Special Trade
Representative for Trade Negotiations and his deputy, and the International Trade Commission (ITC).
At issue was whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief negating the effect of the OMAs. The
defendants moved to dismiss the suit contending that: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) the case was not ripe for adjudication; and (3)
they were not amenable to suit, as the doctrine of sovereign immunity served as a bar and the ITC was not a suable entity. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held for the defendants.
The court initially addressed the procedural issues of standing,
ripeness, and jurisdiction. The court determined that the plaintiffs
met the standing requirements under the test formulated in Associations of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970), by demonstrating that they were unable to fill existing
* Orderly Marketing Agreements are negotiated agreements with foreign countries
limiting the export to the United States of particular articles to prevent or remedy
serious or threatened injury to a domestic industry and to facilitate the orderly adjustment to new competitive conditions by the affected industry. See 19 U.S.C.

§ 2253(a) (1975).
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orders due to the actions of the defendants, and their interests were
within the relevant zone protected by the Trade Act.
The court then concluded that the case was ripe for adjudication
on two grounds: (1) government action prior to the signing of the
OMAs had been formalized and had affected the plaintiffs in a concrete way, following the general principle of Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 186 (1967); and (2) in any event, the. issues presented by the plaintiffs were appropriate for judicial determination, as
the OMAs were at least six months old at the time the cause was
remanded for trial.
As to the issue of jurisdiction, the court cited the case of Larson
v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949), which
held that where powers are limited by statute, actions beyond those
limitations are not sovereign actions; this ruling was an exception to
the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in suits against
the United States government. The instant case fell squarely within
this exception. If the court were to hold for the plaintiffs on the
merits and find that the defendants had failed to comply with the
statutory provisions, the defendants would then be deemed to have
exceeded their specific statutorily delegated authority and hence be
subject to suit. Furthermore, the court affirmed that the ITC was
indeed a suable entity.
Having dispensed with the procedural issues, the district court
next considered the plaintiffs' allegations as to the ITC. As currently
set up, the ITC conducts investigations at its own volition or at the
request of the President, Congress, or an affected industry. Its findings are then sent to the President in order to invoke an appropriate
remedy. The ITC may reinvestigate a previously reported matter
within one year, but only upon a showing of "good cause," pursuant
to § 201(e) of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(e) (1975).
In the instant case, the ITC conducted a preliminary investigation and unanimously found that the imported footwear was injurious
to the domestic footwear industry; it did not, however, propose a
remedy. Upon examination of the matter, the President determined
that the proper remedy in this case was adjustment assistance and not
import relief. Less than one year later, the Senate Finance Committee directed the ITC to conduct a new investigation and the ITC met
to consider whether good cause existed, pursuant to § 201(e) of the
Act. The plaintiffs argued that the Senate directive could not be the
basis for the ITC reinvestigation; rather, substantial new evidence
had to be presented by the affected industry to the ITC before it
could proceed under § 201(e). The court found that the plaintiffs' ar-
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gument had no support in the Act; § 201(e) is silent on the question
of who may request a reinvestigation. The Trade Act only specifies
which entities may request an original ITC investigation. If Congress
had intended this limitation to apply in the case of a reinvestigation,
it would have so provided in the Act.
The plaintiffs next challenged that the ITC committed a due process violation in its reinvestigation. No formal public notice had been
given and no public hearings were held for the benefit of parties affected by the ITC report. As there is no statutory requirement to this
effect, the court found no due process violation, declaring that a hearing need only be granted sometime before the final order becomes
effective. The ITC report was not a final order, and the ITC did, in
fact, hold hearings on the merits of the "good cause" determination;
the plaintiffs, however, neglected to participate in those hearings.
The importers then attacked the "good cause" determination itself, claiming it was unsupported by sufficient evidence. As a preliminary matter, however, the court questioned whether that determination was subject to judicial review. It reasoned that the "good
cause" determination was the equivalent of a decision by the ITC. As
Congress did not define "good cause" within § 201(e), such a determination was left solely to the ITC. Even if a finding of "good cause"
was reviewable under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 701 (1966), the ITC determination would be upheld, as it is
not the function of the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
ITC. In examining an ITC decision, a court need only look at
whether the finding was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
The plaintiffs' final challenge to the ITC concerned the sufficiency of the notice of hearing subsequent to the "good cause" determination. They alleged that the notice failed to articulate both the
reasons for the determination, as well as the existence of any new
evidence of injury to the domestic industry. Nevertheless, -the court
resolved that these items need not be included in a notice of reinvestigation, as they were not required by the Act and no Congressional
intent has been shown to require any such notice.
With regard to President Carter, the plaintiffs claimed he violated § 202(b)(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (1975) by failing to
detail the substance of the determination. Under the Act, the President must publish within sixty days in the Federal Register, the
method and amount of import relief he will provide. The court determined that the President had complied with the statute, as he had
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published the fact that he had made a determination and Congressional intent did not require the President to publish the substance of
his determination.
The plaintiffs then asserted that the import relief provided by the
President was not "commensurate with the injury found by the ITC."
The court noted, however, that this phrase was not contained in the
Act itself;'its presence in the report of the Senate Finance Committee
was meant only to serve as a guide for the President to follow. The
plaintiffs objected that the relief did not apply to other countries
which also export footwear to the United States. The court refused to
rule on this issue, as the decision to negotiate OMAs with some countries and not with others is a purely political question.
Under § 203(b)(1) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b)(1) (1975), the
President must transmit to Congress a document setting forth the
action proposed on the same day that he announces he will seek an
OMA. The plaintiffs complained that the President did not comply
with this requirement and that, in any case, his report was insufficient to permit Congressional review. The court determined that the
plaintiffs' contention was not borne out by the facts. Congress needs
only to be informed of the President's action, and the court declared
that it was not necessary for the President to give his reasons for his
actions, as they did not differ from the ITC recommendations. Furthermore, the court said that the record gave no indication that Congress felt compromised in its authority to review the executive action.
The plaintiffs then asserted that the quantitative restrictions imposed by the OMAs were greater than the maximum amount permissible under § 203(d)(2) of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (1975). This section
of the Act permits the President to determine what the representative period will be for purposes of determining that amount. In the
instant case, the President chose the period 1974-76 as the "most
representative period." The court found that the Act left this determination to the President's discretion. Notwithstanding, the decision
was not subject to review because it went to the substance of the
agreements and as such, was a political question.
The plaintiffs' last allegation regarding the President's actions was
directed to the means employed by him in ordering negotiations for
the OMAs. The plaintiffs claimed that the President failed to consider
the nine factors required by the Act. The President answered that he
considered these factors in reaching his decision and the court observed that, as the President is assumed to be a "man of conscience,"
his assurances are presumed to be valid. In addition, the Special
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Trade Representative submitted an affidavit stating that the nine factors were discussed with the President.
The plaintiffs' final contentions concerned alleged violations of
two "most-favored-nation provisions," the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade, 61 Stat. Parts 5 and 6, TIAS No. 1700 (GATI'), and
the antitrust laws. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the OMAs violated
the most-favored-nation provisions of the existing Treaties of Friendship with Korea and Taiwan, which were entered into in 1957 and
1948, respectively. In this respect, the court stated that even if the
treaties did confer a private right of action for the abridgment of their
terms, the right would pertain only to the nationals of one party
within the territory of the other party. Moreover, the OMAs were
negotiated and not unilaterally imposed by the United States. The
court failed, however, to mention the relative bargaining positions of
the parties, Finally, the court noted that the Act permits the President to act without regard to existing most-favored-nation clauses.
Thus, the court concluded that to the extent that the Act is inconsistent with existing treaties, the provisions of the Act prevail, as the
Act is a more recent enactment.
It was further alleged that the President's actions violated GATT.
The court found that: (1) the GATT had not been ratified by Congress; and (2) the GATT provides for the suspensions of obligations if
imports of a given product threaten serious injury to domestic producers. In concluding, the court noted that the OMAs did not violate
antitrust laws, reasoning that where trade restraint is the result of
valid government action, § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1975) has not been violated. The actions of the ITC and the President were in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
The major significance of this case is that domestic private parties
may now seek federal court injunctions against the implementation of
international trade agreements negotiated between the United States
and other nations. A mere showing, however, that private business
interests have been adversely affected by government trade policy
enacted in the national interest, is not in itself a sufficient injury to
warrant injunction of federal policy. Limited by the political question
doctrine, federal courts will continue to refuse to look at the impact
of the trade policies of the United States in granting relief; rather,
they will only examine the methods utilized in formulating these
policies. Thus, in international trade, private American entities are
obliged to follow established government policies unless these policies
have been improperly implemented.
CHARLES R. FRANKLIN

